Introduction
The aim of this article is twofold. It firstly determines the variations in the skill premia linked to each level of education in France over the period . From this first result, we analyse the intergenerational skill transmission for the individuals surveyed in 1993 and 2003.
Since the seminal work of Mincer (1974) , a large body of empirical literature has analysed the impact of education upon wages. These works typically diagnose a large and significant impact (see the reviews of Psacharopoulos, 1985 and 1994; Cohn and Addison, 1994; Card, 1999; Black and Devereux, 2011) . In line with Mincer's equation, most empirical studies have measured the education level by the schooling years above a lower limit of 6 or 7 years (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004) . In their review of the empirical works on France, Hanchane and Moullet (2000) present eight studies, all of them measuring human capital by the number of schooling years. Nevertheless, this measure suffers several limitations. In particular, it gives the same weight to all the schooling years regardless of the educational level. Several studies have found decreasing returns to the schooling years (Psacharopoulos, 1994; Wössmann, 2003) . In their analyses of the French case, Jarousse and Mingat (1986) and Goux and Maurin (1994) have improved the measure based on schooling years by accounting for repeated years and by distinguishing the certified from the non certified years. Introducing qualitative variables, Jarousse and Mingat (1986) also find that, compared to the average return to the related schooling years, the University 'Deuxième Cycle' (final two Degree years) shows a wage deficit of 9% whereas the 'Grandes Ecoles' (Post Graduate Schools)
Degree benefits from a wage surplus of 30%. These results suggest that the wage value of one schooling year can critically differ depending on the stage and the type of study considered.
Since Becker and Tomes (1976 , 1979 , the family background has been considered as a key determinant of children's education and income (Piketty, 2000; Chusseau and Hellier, 2012) . A sizeable impact indicates a low intergenerational mobility. The influence of parents on their children's human capital runs through several channels. Firstly, intra-family human capital externalities and transfers impact upon both the children's human capital and their capacity to learn. In this respect, a number of empirical works have underlined the influence of parental characteristics upon children's performance at school (Acemoglu and Pischke, 2001 , for the US; Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001 , for the UK; Lauer, 2003, for Germany and France; Checchi et al., 2008, and Brunello and Checchi, 2005 , for Italy, Liu et al., 2000 and 2006, for Taiwan) . A second channel of influence comes from the impact of parents' income on the funding of their children's education. Highly skilled parents have higher incomes and can thereby invest more in their offspring's education, resulting in higher skill and incomes of their children (Solon, 2004) . Family funding is essential when credit market imperfections prevent youngsters from borrowing for their education (Becker and Tomes, 1979; Mulligan, 1997; Han and Mulligan, 2001; Grawe and Mulligan, 2002; Grawe, 2004) . In addition, children with educated parents are more and better informed (Entwistle and Alexander, 1992) . Finally, the literature has pointed to the genetically transmitted differences in ability (Miller et al., 1995; Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994; Rouse, 1999; Gintis, 2001, 2002) .
The impact of parents' position upon children's attainment has typically been estimated by intergenerational elasticities of earnings and/or education.
An abundant empirical literature has analysed the impact of parent's income upon the child's income through intergenerational earnings elasticities 1 . Intergenerational income elasticities critically differ across countries, the lowest values (less than 0.3) being found in
Nordic countries (Björklund and Jäntti, 1997; Österberg, 2000; Jänti et al., 2006) and the highest (between 0.4 and 0.6) in the US (Solon, 1992; Jänti et al., 2006; Mazumder, 2005) , the UK and France being in-between (Nicoletti and Ermisch, 2007 and Blanden et al., 2004 for the UK; Lefranc and Trannoy, 2005 for France).
Intergenerational mobility has also been measured by the influence of parents' human capital on their children's human capital (education). In these works, human capital is typically measured by the number of schooling years, and OLS are used to estimate intergenerational human capital elasticity. For the US, Mulligan (1997) Fabre and Moullet (2004) find an intergenerational coefficient of education of 0.31 between father and son and a mother-son coefficient of 0.29. By using the number of schooling years to measure human capital, these empirical works are exposed to the already mentioned critique of allocating the same weight to qualitatively different schooling years.
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In this article, we firstly develop a theoretical model in which individuals choose their skill level by maximising the return to education, with the different stages/cycles of education providing uneven income gains and the educational attainment depending on the parents' skill and income. We subsequently estimate a slightly modified empirical version of the model on the French database FQP, (i) to quantify the return (skill premium) to each level of the French educational system, and (ii) to measure the impact of the parents' human capital upon the human capital of their offspring, by distinguishing the intra-family skill externalities from the influence of parents' income. Human capital is not measured by schooling years but by its market value calculated from the results of a wage equation. As regards the first point, our main findings are (i) that, compared to the lowest skill level, the skill premium generated by the Baccalaureate (henceforth 'bac') has critically declined since the mid-seventies, and (ii) that the premium generated by higher education in relation to the level of the bac has increased, but this increase is not sufficient to offset the decline in the return to the bac.
Consequently, France has experienced a general decrease in its skill premia. Concerning the second point, our calculations reveal that the impact of the family backgrounds upon the individuals' skill has critically increased from 1993 to 2003, this increase essentially deriving from a higher impact of parental income upon the educational attainment. At the same time, the impact of public educational expenditure has also increased.
In Section 2, we build the structural framework which is subsequently transformed into an empirical model utilised for the estimations. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 the construction of the variables and the econometric methods. The results are exposed and discussed in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
The model
We construct the theoretical framework from which we subsequently derive the empirical model that is estimated in the following sections.
The theoretical model
We develop a theoretical framework which synthesises the two main channels through which the parents influence their children's skill, i.e., their income on the one hand and the human capital intra-family externality and transfers on the other. These generate an intergenerational transmission of human capital and a persistence of skill discrepancies across the dynasties.
Human capital and income
We assume that a working individual is paid in proportion to her/his human capital. Denoting W the wage per unit of human capital and i H the amount of human capital possessed by individual i, her/his wage i W is:
The individual's human capital is fully determined by her/his course of study. This course of study consists of an ordered succession of education cycles such that an individual who wants to enter cycle k must have successfully completed all the preceding cycles.
Each cycle provides a specific contribution to the accumulation of human capital. By assuming a continuum of cycles over the interval 0,k By combining equations (1) and (2) we obtain:
Education function
There is a continuum of possible skills over the interval 1,
The human capital that individual i can acquire depends (i) on her/his effort i E in studying, (ii) on her/his parents' income , 1 i R − which measures the family's financial contribution to her/his education (subscript -1 denotes the preceding generation), (iii) on her/his parents human capital , 1 i H − through intra-family human capital externalities, and (iv) on the public expenditure for education from which s/he benefits. The amount of public
The utility function (6) is rather general. It stipulates that utility depends (i) positively on income i WH with the marginal utility of income decreasing or constant, and (ii) negatively on the studying effort i E with the marginal disutility of effort increasing or constant. Coefficient δ depicts the effort aversion that is assumed identical across individuals.
The individual maximises her/his utility subject to the inverted education function (5).
The resulting optimal human capital of the individual is (see Appendix 1):
where ( )
is the elasticity of ( ) i G H in relation to the human capital level. We assume that this elasticity is constant and lower than 1.
The empirical model
The model constructed in Subsection 2.1 provides:
1) A simple relation between earnings and the accumulated human capital (Relation 1).
2) A measure of the individual skill as a combination of successive education cycles that bring uneven contributions to the wage value of the human capital (Relations 2 and 3);
3) A determination of the human capital chosen by the individual that depends on parental characteristics and on the educational policy (Relation 7).
From this model, the impact of the parents' skill upon the children's skill can be estimated in two stages:
1) Firstly, estimating Relation (3) makes it possible to determine the wage value of the human capital of each educational cycle and thus of each individual.
2) Once calculated this human capital value, estimating (7) provides (i) the impact of the parents' human capital upon the children's human capital and (ii) the division of this impact between two components, one linked to the parents' income and the other to intra-family externalities. (2) and (3) as follows:
where k is the highest possible number of educational cycles and 1, 0 ik e = according to whether individual i has completed cycle k or not.
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In addition, Equations (3) and (3') assume (i) that human capital is the only determinant of labour efficiency, and (ii) that the labour market is perfectly competitive. Relaxing these assumptions, we now introduce the following additional variables which impact upon wages:
1) Certain individual characteristics that influence earnings for objective reasons (experience, time-related obsolescence, training etc.) or socio-cultural prejudice (gender, race, foreign origins etc.).
2) Certain characteristics related to the firm (size, location etc.) or to the industry which cause wage discrepancies when markets are not perfectly competitive.
The impact of these two sets of characteristics on individual i's wage is denoted by the variable i Ω defined as follows: As a consequence, the wage equation (1) is modified in the following way:
The estimated wage equation. By inserting (2') and (8) into the logarithm of (9), we obtain the following relation: The estimation of Equation (10) 
9 Equation (11) shows that two individuals who pursue the same course of study possess the same human capital, i.e., each course of study determines one unique level of human capital.
It should be remembered that what is calculated here is the economic value of each cycles.
Human capital is thus measured in terms of its return in the labour market.
At the end of this first stage, we can assign to each individual of our sample the human capital measure which corresponds to her/his course of study.
Second stage: estimation of the education function
We start from Equation (7):
The variables i H and , 1 i H − , i.e., the individual's and her/his parent's human capital, are calculated from their courses of study as defined by Equation (11).
The parents' income. The parents' income is measured by the father's wage (see the explanation below), which can be written because of (1) and (9): By inserting (12) into (7) and after simplification we obtain: The variable i G . i G depicts the impact of public expenditure in the educational cycles followed by individual i upon her/his human capital. We assume the following indicator i G for an individual who has attained the skill level i k :
with k n the number of years necessary to complete cycle k, ki D the yearly public spending allocated to cycle k when individual i was participating in this cycle and ki N the average yearly number of pupils in k at the time when individual i followed cycle k (the expenditure and the number of pupils/students in each cycle change every year). The precise method of calculation of i G used in the estimations is described in Subsection 4.2.
The estimated relation. By log-linearising function (13) we obtain:
Note that, since W is the same for all individuals, the log of (7) In stage 1, we estimate a wage equation for those individuals who occupy jobs which are both gainful and full time. These features require the removal of a number of observations as depicted in Table 1 . In stage 2, we estimate an education function in which an individual's human capital depends on her/his parents' human capital and income, and on the public expenditure the individual benefits from, depending on the stages of study s/he has followed.
The parents are identified by the father because of the availability in the database of the variables required for the estimations.
In addition, we must utilise data from the 1977 and 1985 surveys to approximate the father's income in 1993 and 2003 (see the method in Subsection 4.2.), which restricts the education function estimations to these last two years.
To calculate the public expenditure an individual benefits from during her/his course of study, we need the expenditure allocated to each cycle when the individual was at school. As data on public expenditure for education are not available before 1974, this expense will be approximated by the number of professors in each level, provided by the INSEE 2 . Given that these data are not available before 1948, the estimations are implemented for individuals between 20 and 50 years of age 3 . Consequently, the estimation of the education function is carried out from a sample of 6261 individuals in 1993, and 7303 in 2003.
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Educational levels (skills)
From the French database FQP, we build a classification of ten levels (courses of studies) and ranked in ascending order of skill. The succession of levels is depicted in Figure 1 . Each individual in the sample is defined by the succession of cycles s/he has followed, and finally by the highest level s/he has achieved. The distribution of individuals between the ten possible levels is depicted in Table 2 for each year. Compared to other countries, the French educational system presented several specificities in the years when the individuals were schooled. Firstly, there was a special degree two years after university entrance (the DEUG), which corresponded to the first cycle of university. This was subsequently discontinued when the European system was implemented. In addition,
France's Grandes Ecoles are very selective tertiary establishments which aim at producing a French elite in high level engineering and business administration. This system is still operative. Finally note that we put together both the 2 nd and 3 rd cycles of university studies because the sample fails to make this distinction for the individuals' fathers. 
First stage: estimation of the wage equation
The explained variable of the wage equation is the (log of the) monthly wage for full time workers. This creates a self-selection bias: the wages and individual characteristics are only selected for full time working wage earners. In this case, the OLS method provides biased estimations. This selection bias can be treated through the Heckman selection model. The
Heckman selection model (Gronau, 1974; Lewis, 1974; Heckman, 1976 and 1979) 
P is the probability of being a full time wage earner. i z is the vector of explanatory variables utilised in the selection equation (Table A1 in Appendix 4) and 0i
µ is the error term. We add an instrumental variable that is linked to the probability of participating in the labour market and being a full time wage earner, but bears no influence on the level of wage. This instrumental variable is the presence in the household of children of less than 6 years old. As a matter of fact, this presence could lower the probability of participating in the labour market, and especially the probability of choosing a full time job. are the successive cycles s/he has followed, the ij ω s her/his personal characteristics, and i µ is the error term.
The variables ij ω selected for the wage equation are depicted in Table 3 . These comprise age, gender, nationality, marital status, experience, obsolescence, working district, working sector, and variables indicating the participation in training programmes 5 . Concerning these variables, we introduce (i) dummies for the skill level obtained at the end of the training programme when this level is higher than the skill at the end of initial education and (ii) an additional dummy that accounts for training when this yields a skill level which is not higher than that obtained at the end of initial schooling. 
Second stage: estimation of the education function
In stage 2, we estimate the education function (15) The database provides no information on fathers' incomes, but it provides their professional occupations (6 categories, see Appendix 2). We thereby approximate the father's income by the average income corresponding to his profession. 
Public educational expenditure
Variable i g is the log of ( ) For each individual, we calculate the sum of these ratios within each cycle s/he has followed and each year s/he has spent in this cycle. 
The estimated education function
We estimate the education function 
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A problem of heteroscedasticity may arise from the estimation of the education function because we utilise a limited amount of skill levels and the skill indicator is thus discontinuous.
We use a Breusch-Pagan test to verify heteroscedasticity. The results lead to rejecting the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity 7 . Contrary to the OLS estimator, the variance of this estimator is biased. We thus correct the variance-covariance matrix by using White's correction 8 . This correction provides a convergent estimation of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients with robust standard errors.
Results
Wage equations
The overall results of the estimated wage equations are provided in Appendix 4. All the variables display the expected sign. In this section, we draw attention to the skill premia that are calculated from the coefficients of the wage equations. A skill premium is the ratio of the wage value of a certain level of skill in relation to another level taken as a benchmark. Table 4 describes three types skill premia (henceforth SP). The precise calculation of the three types of skill premium is described in Appendix 5.
For each level of skill, SP1 is the skill premium of this level in relation to the lowest skill, i.e., primary education not completed. SP2 is the marginal skill premium. For each skill level, SP2
7 We obtain 2 (1) 
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provides the skill premium of this level in relation to the level just before it. Finally, SP3
provides the skill premium of each skill above the bac in relation to the skill corresponding to the bac, i.e., the ratio SP1 / SP1 k bac for all the courses of study k higher than the bac. From these results, we infer two major developments:
1) All the skill premia (in relation with the lowest skill) decrease over time (Figure 2 ).
This result is in line with all the indicators of inequality that decrease in France over the given period (e.g., earnings D9/D1 calculated by the OECD; share of Q5/Q1 and Gini provided by Eurostat for individual incomes etc.).
2) The decrease is totally attributable to the lowest skills, i.e., these skills up to the bac. In particular, the skill premium linked to the accession to the bac diminishes from 1.74 in 1977 to 1.40 in 2003. Contrarily, the skill premia of the different higher degrees in relation to the bac increase over time (Figure 3) . However, these increases are not sufficient to offset the decrease in the lowest skill premia.
We can make the following two additional remarks:
1) The decrease in the skill premium of the Grandes Ecoles (in relation to the bac) between 1993 and 2003 could derive from the fact that new and less prestigious establishments were inserted into this group in 2003.
2) The skill premia calculated here may appear rather weak compared to the usual measures of inequality (for instance, the D9/D1 ratio calculated by the OECD for France is equal to 3.03 in 2003). This derives from the fact that several determinants of wage inequality such as experience, gender, location, etc. are not included in our skill premia that only measure the impact of (initial) education upon wage. Table 5 depicts the result of the education function estimations, and table 6 the decomposition of the total family impact between the intra-family skill externality and the influence of the family income. 3) The impact of public education expenditure increases, with an elasticity that widened from 0.50 in 1993 to 0.673 ten years later.
Education function
Finally note that the constant has increased, which is as expected since the constant includes the impact of the real wage that increased from 1993 until 2003. 20
Discussion
The estimated wage functions and education functions reveal several significant changes:
1) The wage values of all the skill levels up to the Baccalaureate have critically decreased over the period 1977-2003. 2) In relation to the bac, the wage values of all tertiary education levels rose, but this rise was not sufficient to offset the decrease in the skill premium of the bac. As a consequence, all the skill premia (in relation to the lowest skill) decreased throughout the period 1997-2003, which denotes a reduction in inequality.
3) The total impact of the family (father) upon the individuals' education attainments has significantly increased from 1993 to 2003, and this rise essentially derives from the family's income, albeit that the influence of intra-family skill externalities also increased.
4) The impact of public education expenditure on the individuals' educational attainment has increased. This shows that higher public expenditure for education could offset the increasing impact of the family.
Finally, our results draw a rather mixed picture that combines lower inequality -since the skill premia decreased -and lower social mobility -since the impact of family background increased. The first result could derive, at least partially, from labour market institutions, such as the minimum wage, which narrowed inequality in the short term, whereas the rising influence of family characteristics tended to perpetuate inequality in the longer term.
However, the increase in the impact of public educational expenditure provides a tool to counteract the influence of family background.
Conclusion
We have estimated a structural model using French data (i) to measure the return to each skill level, and (ii) to evaluate the influence of the parents' human capital upon the human capital of their children. As regards this second point, the model makes it possible to distinguish between the two main channels through which the parents influence their children's skill:
their income and the intra-family skill externalities. To measure human capital, we do not use the schooling years but its efficiency on the labour market resulting from the estimation of a wage equation.
We show that between 1977 and 2003, France underwent a general decrease in its skill premia due to the critical decline in the return to the bac. The skill premium of all tertiary education levels rose in relation to the level of the bac, but this increase was not sufficient to offset the decline in the skill premium of the bac. Finally, our estimations reveal lower social mobility since the influence of the family upon the individuals' skills critically increased from 1993 to 2003. At the same time, the impact of public educational expenditure also increased. After Berthoin law (Entry in primary education after 1958) Primary education not completed 8 10 Primary education completed 6 + 2 = 8 6 + 4 = 10 Secondary education 1st cycle 6 + 5 = 11 6 + 6 = 12 Baccalaureate & Secondary education 2 nd cycle 5 (primary) + 8 (secondary) = 13 University (1st cycle) 5 (primary) + 7 (secondary) + 2 (tertiary education) = 14 University 2 nd cycle 5 (primary) + 7 (secondary) + 4 (tertiary education) = 16 University 3rd cycle 5 (primary) + 7 (secondary) + 6 (tertiary education) = 18
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Appendix 4. Estimation of the wage equation 2) The marginal skill premium is calculated in relation to the skill level just before (e.g., in
1977 the marginal skill premium for the bac is 0.,089
1.09 e = ). Note that, for all tertiary education levels, the marginal skill premia are calculated in relation to the bac, except for the university 2 nd & 3 rd cycles for which the reference is the University 1 st cycle.
3) The skill premium of each skill above the bac in relation to the bac is obtained by the ratio
SP1 / SP1
k bac for all the courses of study k higher than the bac.
